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NOTE
CITZEN ENFORCEMENT OF CLEAN WATER ACT
VIOLATIONS; THE SUPREME COURT STEERS A NEW
COURSE OVER MUDDIED WATERS; Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.'
the Supreme Court held that citizens may bring suit under the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act2 if they can make a good faith allegation of

continuous or intermittent violations;3 but they may not bring suit for
wholly past violations. 4 The Court's decision cleared up a three way

conflict in the circuit courts' interpretations of the citizen suit provisions
of the Clean Water Act (FWPCA). Most importantly, the decision affected
the manner, and influences the shape of future citizen suits.
Between 1981 and 1984, the petitioner, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
a company engaged in the processing and packing of pork products,
discharged effluents in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit (NPDES permit).' Gwaltney's permit was issued
in accordance with procedures and regulations promulgated under the
FWPCA. 6 The permit authorized the discharge of pollutants in accord

with section 402 of the FWPCA which sets up the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 7 ITT-Gwaltney's 1974 permit
allowed the discharge of five pollutants into the Pagan River.8 In 1981,
Gwaltney assumed responsibility under the permit after having acquired
the assets of ITT-Gwaltney and the Gwaltney plant.' Between 1981 and
1984 Gwaltney repeatedly violated daily limits for various pollutants as

well as monthly average limitations."°
1. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982) (hereinafter the The FWPCA).
3. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
4. Id. at 59.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1544
(E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (citing 33 U.S.C § 1342 (1982)).
7. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). The federal program is run in conjunction with
any state that wishes to establish its own permit program. However, in the absence of diligent
prosecution by state or federal authorities, citizens may bring suit under § 1365(a)(1).
8. "Those pollutants are: (i) fecal coliform; (ii) chlorine (CL2); (iii) total suspended solids (TSS);
(iv) total kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN); and (v) oil and grease," Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 611 F.
Supp. at 1544, n.2.
9. Id. at 1545.
10. Id. at 1552.
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To enforce the permit, respondents Chesapeake Bay Foundation and
the Natural Resources Defense Council (Chesapeake Bay), both environmental groups with members residing in Virginia, used FWPCA's

citizen suit provision which authorizes citizen suits in the absence of
federal or state enforcement." Under section 1365(b) of the Clean Water
Act, Chesapeake Bay was required first to notify the federal administrator,
the state in which the alleged violation occured, and the alleged violator;
then to give the state or federal authorities 60 days to intervene and
enforce the NPDES violations. 2 Having established jurisdiction under
section 1365, Chesapeake Bay filed suit alleging NPDES violations. 3
At trial the district court granted Chesapeake Bay's motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability and held a hearing to determine
the amount of civil penalties to be assessed against Gwaltney under section
1319(d) of the act.' 4 Gwaltney did not contest Chesapeake Bay's alle-

gations concerning the violations which Gwaltney reported pursuant to
section 1318(a)(3)(A)." Instead, Gwaltney filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that citizen suits are permitted
only for violations which exist at the time the suit is filed.' 6 Gwaltney

argued that since its last violation occured one month before the suit was
filed, the court did not have jurisdiction. 7 The district court denied Gwalt-

! . Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil
action on his own behalf- 1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and
(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation ..... The district
courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such
an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may
be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) provides:
No action may be commenced (1)under subsection (a)(I) of this section (A) prior to
sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State . . . and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil
or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance
with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right ...
13. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 611 F. Supp. at 1544.
14. Id. at 1544.
15. Id. at 1544-45. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A) (1982) states that: "the Administrator shall require
the owner or operator of any point source to (i) establish and maintain such records, (ii) make such
reports, . . . and (v) provide such other information as he may reasonably require....
16. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 611 F. Supp at 1547.
17. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F2d 304, 307 (4th
Cir. 1986).
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ney's motion holding that citizen suit jurisdiction could lie in the absence
of an ongoing violation." The district court ruled in Chesapeake's favor
and awarded a civil penalty of $1,285,322 against Gwaltney.' 9
On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
After examining the statutory language and legislative history behind
section 1365, the court held that citizens have the power to sue for wholly
past violations of the act.' The court rejected Gwaltney's argument that
the citizen only had a supplemental role in enforcing compliance with
the act." The court held that citizen power is coextensive with that of
the government and therefore the citizen plaintiff could, like the government, sue for penalties for wholly past violations.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorariand held that citizens may not
bring suit for wholly past violations but may bring suit, if at the time of
the trial, they have made at least a good faith allegation of continuous
or intermittent violations.23 The Court viewed the citizen suit role as one
intended to supplement the government's enforcement power, since the
court interpreted the act to give the citizen the power to sue in order to
prevent future effluent violations." The Court ruled that a federal court
has jurisdiction over a citizen suit brought under the FWPCA if there is
a likelihood at the time of trial that the defendant will continue to violate
its NPDES permit.25
BACKGROUND
Before the Supreme Court decided Gwaltney, the circuit courts had
arrived at three different interpretations of the Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision. In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock, 26 property owners
whose creek was polluted by a one-time oil leak from a pipeline, brought
suit in 1983 under the FWPCA, seeking civil penalties and injunctive
relief. They also brought a state law negligence claim.27
18. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 611 F. Supp at 1548.
19. Id. at 1565. Although the mandatory penalty would have been $6,530.00, Congress gave the
district court discretion under § 1319(d) to award any penalty that it thought appropriate under the
circumstances of each particular case. id. at 1553 (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)). For a discussion
of the factors the court used in determining the appropriate penalty, see the discussion at id. 155657.
20. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 791 F.2d at 313.
21. Id. at 310.
22. Id. at 313.
23. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987).
24. Id. at 60.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Harmker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).

27. Id. at 394. (The Hamkers state law cause of action was based on Diamond Shamrock's
negligent maintenance and operation of the pipeline and failure to clean up the spill in a timely
fashion.)
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The court held that it has jurisdiction to hear a section 1365 claim only
when there is an allegation of a contiuing violation at the time the suit
is filed. 28 The court found no reason to examine the legislative history
behind section 1365 because the statutory language was clear. 9 The court
found that the words in section 1365 require an allegation of an ongoing
violation: "[Any citizen may commence a civil action . . . against any
person . . . who is alleged to be in violation .. ."3 The court refused
to strain the meaning of the statute by allowing suits for wholly past
violations.
The Hamker court concluded that the act's structure gave primary
enforcement authority to the states and the administrator of the EPA. 3' It
reached that conclusion by comparing the "in violation" language of
section 1365 with the enumerated enforcement powers given the government in section 1319. The court recognized that under section 1365, the
citizen must give the administrator notice and then wait 60 days before
filing suit. 32 The court regarded this 60 day interval as a time during
which a citizen must defer to the administrator's decision to undertake
enforcement. If the administrator decided to act, the administrator would
have unconditional power under section 1319 to sue for past violations.33
If, however, the administrator decided not to enforce the act, the citizen
could continue its section 1365 action. The citizen's suit was meant to
redress only ongoing violations, however, because Congress had not
granted citizens the same range of powers in section 1365 as were available to the administrator under section 1319.' Although the court could
issue civil penalties, the court's interpretation of the act necessarily limited
the citizen's remedy to an injunction against future effluent violations.
The court also reiterated a concern first raised by the Supreme Court
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association that Congress intended to disallow citizen suits for past viola35
tions since these suits would unduly burden the federal district courts.
Plaintiffs with state law damage claims would be motivated to bring suit
under the Clean Water Act since the act authorized awards for attorney's
fees and expenses. 36 The court stated that the state law damage claims
should be heard on the state level while the federal forum should be
28. Id. at 395.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 395 (quoting the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982)).
31. Id. at 396.
32. Id. at 395.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 396.
35. Id.(discussing Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,
453 U.S. I,17 n. 27 (1981)).
36. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
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reserved for plaintiffs, "motivated soley by the desire 'to protect the
health and welfare of those suing and others similarly situated."3'
The First Circuit's interpretation of the Clean Water Act differed from
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation. In Pawtuxet Cove Marina v. Ciba Geigy
Corp., the court held that jurisdiction lies under section 1365, when "the
citizen plaintiff fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant,
if not enjoined, will again proceed to violate the Act." 3 Although the
court agreed with the Fifth Circuit decision in Hamker, that a citizen
could not bring suit to redress a wholly past violation, the court maintained
that a suit would not be dismissed just because no violations occurred on
the date the complaint was filed.39 That there was no violation on the
date of institution of the suit did not mean that future violations would
not occur. 40
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the First Circuit stated that a necessary
consequence of its holding was that there could be an assessment of civil
penalties when the request for civil penalties was part of a reasonable
request for injunctive relief.4 The court rested its decision on the 60 day
notice provision.4 ' The court saw no reason why a citizen should not be
allowed to sue for past violations if after 60 days the administrator or
state decided not to intervene, and if the conduct of the defendant was
likely to continue in the future. The court reasoned that if someone
violated the act only once, neither past violations nor injunctive relief
would be assessed, while if someone continually violated the act, the
plaintiff should be allowed injunctive relief.43 Furthermore, in the case
of a continuous or intermittent violator, "past permit violations [would
be] relevant to the extent that they cast light on the propriety of an
injunction .. . ,"44 and if such violations were shown in order to show
the need for an injunction, then the court saw no reason why such civil
penalties should not be assessed, even if the injunctive relief was denied. 45
Hence, a plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive relief may
recover civil penalties for past violations.'
The Fourth Circuit decision in Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. held that courts have jurisdiction to hear
37. Id. (quoting the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982)).
38. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986). The
court affirmed dissmissal of the case because the defendants were no longer operating under an
NPDES permit and hence there was no likelihood of a future violation.
39. Id. at 1094.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 1093.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
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citizen suits based on wholly past violations.47 This decision rejected both
the previous Hamker holding that jurisdiction only lies where the polluter
must be violating the act at the time the complaint is filed, as well as the
Pautuxetholding that a citizen suit is precluded for wholly past violations.
The Gwaltney court found fault with the Hamker court holding that
the legislative history and wording of the act was unambiguous. The court
noted that the words, " to be in violation" lent support to a reading that
one is, "'in violation 'land continues to be 'in violation' by having 'violated." '" The court recognized that such a reading of the act would
give the citizen the power to bring an action even where there was not
an ongoing violation and that it would have to look at the structure of
the statute and its legislative history to determine the extent of citizen
suit jurisdiction.49
The Gwaltney court compared section 1365 with section 1319. The
court noted that the act used the present tense when referring to the
government's enforcement authority under section 1319(a)(1) and section
1319(a)(3). Although the words standing alone could give rise to different
interpretations, the fact that a similar tense was used under section 1319
lent substantial support to the conclusion that a citizen's enforcement
authority was co-extensive with that of the government's.5 ° The Gwaltney
court also pointed out that, "section [1365(a)] . . . expressly authorizes
the court in a citizen suit to 'apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section [1319(d) of this title]."' 5' The court noted that this language
served a significant deterrent effect which would be thwarted if the language of the statute was construed any other way. 52
The Gwaltney court then analyzed the legislative history of the act
which it found spoke to both giving the citizen abatement authority as
well as the separate authority to sue for past violations 3 The court relied
on the testimony of Senator Muskie, a principal sponsor of the bill, as
47. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). See also, Sierra Club v. C.G. Mfg., Inc., 638 F. Supp.
492 (D. Mass. 1986); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc. 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985); Student
Pub. Interest v. A.T. & T. Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D. N.J. 1985); Student Pub.
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (1. N.J.
1985); Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Job Plating Co., 623 F Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1985);
Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Sierra Club v. Hanna
Furnace Corp., 636 F. Supp. 527 (W.D, N.Y. 1985).
48. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F. 2d 304, 309 (4th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
600 FSupp. 1474, 1476 (D. N.J. 1985)).
49. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 791 F.2d at 309.
50. Id. at 310
51. Id. (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982)).
52. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 791 F.2d at 309.
53. Id. at 311-12.
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particular evidence of legislative intent to allow suits for past violations.
Hence the court found that the ambiguous language of the statute, and
the legislative intent, combined to support a statutory interpretation which
empowers the citizen to sue for past violations.54
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On appeal from the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that although citizens may bring suit under the CWA if they can make a good
faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violations, they may not
bring suit for wholly past violations. In addressing the issue of whether
citizens could bring suit for wholly past violations, the Court had to
determine the congressionally established limits on citizen powers under
the act. The Court started by analyzing the statute's citizen suit provisions
and comparing it with the citizen suit provisions of other acts. 5 The Court
then examined the language of the statute and its legislative history as
an aid in determining whether citizens were empowered to bring suits
for wholly past violations. The Court agreed with Chesapeake Bay's
contention that the language of section 1365 standing alone could support
more than one interpretation. But the Court did not accept Chesapeake
Bay's contention that the present tense phrasing was a congessional accident because Congress used identical language in other acts authorizing
only prospective relief. 6
Starting with the statute, the Court compared section 1365 to section
7
1319(a), which also uses the "in violation language. "'5
Chesapeake Bay
argued that since section 1319(a) authorizes the administrator to recover
civil penalties for wholly past violations, the identical language of section
1365(a) mandates the same power for citizens. The Court disagreed noting
that section 1319(d), the subsection of section 1319(a), is the specific
phrase authorizing the administator to recover civil penalties. The Court
notes that this phrase uses the language "any person who violates" rather
than the "is in violation" language of section 1365(a). Moreover, section
1365 authorizes both civil penalties and injunctive relief in the same
54. id. at 309-13.
55. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
56. Id. & n.2. The Supreme Court notes that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7604 (1982), and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1983) use identical wording while
authorizing only injunctive relief. The Court also points out that other acts, such as the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1111985), were specifically worded to authorize
citizen suits against any "past or present" generator.
57. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. Section 1319 reads: "Whenever. .. the Administrator finds that
any person . . .is in violation of any permit condition or limitation . . .he shall issue an order
requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action
in accordance with subsection (b) of this section." Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1982).
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sentence, while section 1319(a) specifically enumerates the administrator's powers.
The Court found a pervasive use of the present tense throughout section
1365 lending support to its conclusion that section 1365 could not be
read to allow citizen suits for wholly past violations. 8 Although section
1319, which sets forth the administrator's powers, uses the present tense,
the Court found that the 60 day notice requirement would serve no purpose
if citizens could bring suits for wholly past violations. The Court reasoned
that the purpose of this citizen notice provision was to enable the violator
to meet an administrator's compliance order without the necessity of the
administrator's bringing suit. That purpose would be frustrated if a citizen
could bring a suit months or years after the administrator had already
commenced enforcement against the violator.59
The Court found additional support in the legislative history for its
conclusion that section 1365 was meant to give citizens the power to
abate ongoing pollution-not to give them the power to sue for past
violations. The Court relied on both the Congressional Hearings and
Senate and House Reports and found that Congress explicitly connected
section 1365 with the Clean Air Act's injunctive citizen suit provisions.'
While the Court recognized that Senator Muskie, a principal sponsor
of the bill, did not intend the notice requirement to cut off the right of
the citizen to bring suit, the Court found that Senator Muskie meant to
include an occasional or sporadic violator as a violator, but refrained from
imputing to him the intention that a citizen could sue for wholly past
violations. 6
Turning to the issue of standing, the Court stated that just because
Congress intended to grant the citizen enforcement power whenever the
citizen alleges continuous or intermittent violations did not mean that a
citizen suit would be dissmissed just because of absence of violations at
58. "The most telling use of the present tense is in the definition of 'citizen' as 'a person...
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected' by the defendant's violations of the Act."
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982)).
59. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61.
60. Id. at 62 (construing S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1973), reprinted in A
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1497 (1973) and
construing H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1973), reprinted in A Legislative History

of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 820 (1973)).
61. Id. at 63. Senator Muskie states: "[A) citizen has a right . . . to bring an action for an
appropriate remedy in the case of any person who is alleged to be or to have been, in violation,
whether the-violation be a continuous one, or an occaisional or sporadic one." S. Rep. No. 93-1,
92d Cong., 1st sess. 79 (1973) reprinted in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Ammendments of 1972 at 179 (1973). But see, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals interpreted the senator's
remarks to mean that citizens may bring suits for wholly past violations.
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the time the suit was filed.62 The Court found that it is the allegation of
continuous violation that determines jurisdiction, not the actual fact of
violation.63 The Court adressed Gwaltney's contention that citizen plaintiffs must prove their allegations of ongoing violations before jurisdiction
attaches. The Court found that, "Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires pleadings to be based on a good-faith belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry that they are 'well grounded in fact,'
adequately protects defendants from frivolous allegations." '
Gwaltney also argued that a plaintiff would lack standing if a discharger
came into compliance after suit is filed. But the Court found it well
established that only "allegations of fact," not proof, are sufficient to
invoke jurisdiction.6' The Court went on to note that a defendant could
move for summary judgment if the allegations were sham and raised no
issue of material fact. At this point the Plaintiff must, "offer evidence to
support the allegation."'
Justices Scalia, Stevens, and O'Connor concurring in part and concurring in the judgment found fault only with the majority's subject matter
jurisdiction analysis. They argued that if a defendant moved for summary
judgment, the plaintiff must prove its allegations, not merely support
them with evidence.67 If the defendant could clearly show that remedial
steps had been taken to ensure that such violations would never occur
again, the defendant should be able, on a motion for summary judgment,
to get the suit dismissed. Requiring the plaintiff to prove allegations, if
contested, would ensure that the plaintiff was suffering from a remedial
injury in fact."
Gwaltney finally argued that plaintiffs would be permitted to maintain
their suits to conclusion, even if at some point in the litigation, defendants
begin to comply. The Court stated that long standing principles of mootness would apply. It must be "'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.' "
62. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64-65. (The Court noted that the District Court found that even if
there were not jurisdiction for wholly past violations, there would still be jurisdiction here since
Chesapeake Bay made a good faith allegation of continuous violations. The Court remanded the
case to consider Chesapeake Bay's allegations of continuous violations). Id. at 64.
63. Id. at 64-65.
64. Id. at 65
65. Id. at 65 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 67-68. (Justices Scalia, Stevens, and O'Connor concurring).
68. Id. at 70.
69. Id. at 66. (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)
(emphasis added)). The Court also states that the mootness doctrine, "protects plaintiffs from defendants who seek to avoid sanction by predictable 'protestations of repentance and reform."'
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 (quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326,
333 (1952)).
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ANALYSIS AND CONTRIBUTION
The Court's conclusion was based on an intricate explanation of the
procedure Congress expected after the filing of the lawsuit and before
the imposition of relief. The Court's view of this procedure was in turn
rooted in its belief that Congress intended the citizen to have a forward
looking role in abating pollution, supplementary to the primary position
of the administrator's enforcement authority. In other words, the Court
found that Congress intended the administrator to have priority. In addition
to the power to intervene in the citizen suit, the administrator may use a
range of enforcement strategies from negotiating compliance with the
defendant to suing for past violations. If the administrator decides to let
the citizen maintain an action, then the citizen, in keeping with its forward
looking role, may seek to prevent the defendant from future violations
by showing that the defendant is likely to continually violate its permit.7'
The Court's interpretation of the legislative intent and wording of the
act best comports with what the legislature actually intended. While the
Court could have adopted the Hamker approach that an ongoing violation
must be alleged at the time the complaint is filed, the language of the
act does not state that the defendant's present conduct determines liability.
If Congress had intended such a precise test for jurisdiction, it would
have expressly provided it. The language supports an interpretation that
only a good faith allegation is required; that is because the defendant has
violated in the past, he is likely to violate again in the future. There is
no real difference between two defendants who are continuous violators
where only one is in violation on the day the complaint is filed. While
the Court could have adopted the Fourth Circuit approach by reading the
"is in violation" language to mean that the taint of a past violation
continues into the future, neither the statute or the legislative history ever
mention suits for past violations. In fact, the act and the legislative history
define a citizen as one having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected."'
While the Gwaltney Court clearly states that a citizen plaintiff must
make a good faith allegation to get into court, the majority states that
when the case proceeds to trial, the plaintiff must prove allegations of
continuous violations in order to prevail.72 Unfortunately this is the only
statement in the opinion concerning the trial on the merits. Even the
concurring Justices concerned themselves only with the nature of the
70. While the Administrator has a broad range of enforcement powers, the 60 day notice provision
has been criticized as being too short for practical government enforcement and just long enough to
prevent plaintiffs from enjoining emergency situations. See, Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws Part I1, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10407 (November 1984).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
72. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66.
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allegations required for a court to have jurisdiction. It has been suggested
that defendants will take this statement to mean that at trial the plaintiffs
must prove ongoing violations while arguing that the case is moot since
they have achieved compliance since the filing of the suit." Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, may argue that they need only show evidence of
ongoing violations to get into court and that at trial they need only show
that the defendant violated the act. It is clear, however, that simple
allegations will not suffice. Because plaintiffs are now required to allege
the existence of ongoing violations, as opposed to only past violations,
defendants will contest these allegations in order to oust the court of
jurisdiction. At this point plaintiffs will have to come forward with evidence supporting their allegations. Because there is scant mention of the
trial on the merits, it is also possible that courts will interpret the Gwaltney
decision to mean that ongoing violations must be proven at trial.74
CONCLUSION
It is now clear that while citizens may not bring suit for wholly past
violations, they will only have to make an uncontested good faith allegation to get into court. Plaintiffs can expect to offer evidence supporting
their allegations. It is also clear that the lower courts will continue to
have the discretion to award both civil penalties and injunctive relief.
Defendants, on the other hand, do not have to worry about civil penalties
for wholly past violations. In the future, litigation is likely to focus on
the gray area in between a past violation and a continuous violation.7"
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